Augustine

This entry examines Augustine’s relationship with Academic scepticism, the only form of ancient scepticism with which he was demonstrably familiar, primarily through Cicero. It traces the development of Augustine’s attitude from his temporary sympathy for the Academics, following his departure from Manichaeism, to his systematic criticism of their doctrines. Particular attention is devoted to Contra Academicos, where Augustine challenges the impossibility of certain knowledge, the suspension of assent, and the Academic criterion of probability or verisimilitude. The entry reconstructs his principal anti-sceptical arguments and discusses his hypothesis that Academic scepticism served to conceal and protect the authentic teachings of Plato. It then considers the further arguments developed in Augustine’s mature works, especially those grounded in the certainty of the desire for happiness and the indubitability of self-existence and mental acts, exemplified by the formula si fallor, sum. Finally, it examines Augustine’s defence of reasonable assent to uncertain propositions, particularly in relation to testimony, authority, and religious faith. The entry concludes by identifying two open questions: Augustine’s possible indirect acquaintance with other sceptical traditions and the extent to which sceptical methods continued to influence his thought despite his explicit rejection of Academic scepticism.