Metus’ e tutela della volontà negoziale: repressione dell’illecito o reintegrazione patrimoniale?

The article examines the Roman law discipline of metus and the praetorian remedies available against acts performed under moral duress, with particular attention to the actio quod metus causa. After reconstructing the development of the praetorian edict and the transition from the original formula quod vi metusve causa gestum erit to the version centered exclusively on metus, the author highlights how Roman law progressively shifted its focus from the conduct of the wrongdoer to the subjective condition of the victim. The analysis of the praetorian remedies shows that the fundamental basis of protection was not the crimen, but rather the lucrum obtained through the situation of fear. Consequently, they could also be brought against third parties who had not caused the threat but had nevertheless benefited economically from the coerced act. The presence in the actio of the arbitral clause and the possibility of avoiding condemnation through restitution confirm that the primary purpose of the remedy was not punitive, but restorative. Roman law on metus thus emerges as a sophisticated system for the protection of contractual freedom, chiefly aimed at restoring the patrimonial balance altered by fear.