Model pluralism for logic

It is well-recognized in the sciences that a multitude of nonequivalent models are used by researchers to fulfill a range of goals, even for the same target system, a result known broadly as model pluralism. The possibility of the same form of pluralism occurring in logic, however, has not been adequately considered. This is a surprise, given that both logical pluralism and methodological anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the view that the methods of theory-choice in logic are similar to those in the sciences, are now prominent topics. This paper makes the case for four distinct forms of model pluralism in logic, each widely found in the sciences, based upon logical practice. The result is not only interesting in itself but also serves to further support the claims of both methodological AEL and the logic-as-modeling view that we should understand the role of logics (at least sometimes) as akin to scientific models.