Giudizio e realtà. Dalla kantiana confutazione dell'idealismo alla fenomenologia trascendentale

Why did Husserl never offer a “Refutation of Idealism”? The theoretical confrontation with Kant’s transcendental philosophy is certainly one, and one of the few, that seriously and repeatedly engaged Husserl throughout his philosophical career. Moreover, at least since the first volume of the “Ideas”, Husserl has again and again had to confront accusations of solipsism, subjectivism, and idealism. Would it not, therefore, have been natural to take up the Kantian lesson precisely in this regard, to possibly correct or modify it according to the phenomenological viewpoint? In this contribution I try to show the reasons why Husserlian transcendental phenomenology would not, in fact, need a refutation of idealism, provided, however, and contrary to what Husserl often seems to do, one does not “internalize” (all) sensations, and, especially, not their “contents”.