Smart grids provide energy distribution with empowered capabilities thanks to the technological resources of information systems. However, this also poses security threats related to cyberattacks that are difficult to characterize. In this paper, we present a game theoretic model of the interplay between 2 prosumers of a smart grid, interacting as attacker and defender in a strategic setup, and one consumer which is assumed to be passive. We analyze this problem by framing it as a static game of complete information and providing theoretical and numerical discussions of the Nash equilibrium solutions. Finally, we obtain results that can serve as guidelines to characterize the performance of smart grid systems and handle their reliability.
Attack Strategies among Prosumers in Smart Grids: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Badia L.
;Crosara L.;
In corso di stampa
Abstract
Smart grids provide energy distribution with empowered capabilities thanks to the technological resources of information systems. However, this also poses security threats related to cyberattacks that are difficult to characterize. In this paper, we present a game theoretic model of the interplay between 2 prosumers of a smart grid, interacting as attacker and defender in a strategic setup, and one consumer which is assumed to be passive. We analyze this problem by framing it as a static game of complete information and providing theoretical and numerical discussions of the Nash equilibrium solutions. Finally, we obtain results that can serve as guidelines to characterize the performance of smart grid systems and handle their reliability.
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