How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history-dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future, with periodic resetting. Interpreting intergenerational insurance in terms of debt, the fiscal reaction function is nonlinear and the risk premium on debt is lower than the risk premium with complete insurance.
Intergenerational Insurance
Alessia Russo
;
2024
Abstract
How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history-dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future, with periodic resetting. Interpreting intergenerational insurance in terms of debt, the fiscal reaction function is nonlinear and the risk premium on debt is lower than the risk premium with complete insurance.
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Accepted version.pdf
embargo fino al 21/02/2025
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Postprint (accepted version)
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1.15 MB
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Adobe PDF
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