The Resistance of the Given

It has convincingly been asserted that only what is conceptually formed can enter the space of reasons, and that only within the latter can we properly speak of knowledge in a way that is specific of human nature. I purport to show 1) that, even if true, this does not mean that only what is intrinsically conceptual can have epistemic efficacy, 2) that we are able rationally to see nonconceptual contents, and 3) that the “vision” of nonconceptual content plays an essential role within the realm of epistemic rationality. Nonconceptual content is, indeed, given, and its resistance plays a fundamental role to allow us to know that we are in touch with the world. To help us to realize the interplay between conceptual and nonconceptual contents of experience, and how the nonconceptual can genuinely be rationally given before and beyond any mystification of givenness, the paper makes use of Dretske’s idea of simple seeing, and refines it through some Husserlian phenomenological descriptions, reflections, and insights, concerning our perceptual and cognitive life.