We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.

Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools

Bertoni M.
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Brunello G.
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2021

Abstract

We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
el2021.pdf

Open Access dal 28/06/2024

Tipologia: Postprint (accepted version)
Licenza: Accesso libero
Dimensione 247.1 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
247.1 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3411262
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 3
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 3
  • OpenAlex ND
social impact