We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.
Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
ANTONIO NICOLO'Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2021
Abstract
We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.
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