In this paper, we introduce Definitivity Avoidance, a behavioral bias that induces individuals to inefficiently shy away from choices that involve a final judgment. We model its effects and explore how the introduction of explicit exposure mechanisms can contribute to attenuate them. Using a unique natural experiment - the introduction of a technology-assisted review system in professional tennis - we test the model predictions and confirm the relevance of this behavioral bias in a competitive setting. Possible instances of definitivity avoidance can be identified in multiple contexts such as debt roll-over decisions, inefficient asset allocations, court rulings, and child adoptions. The broad applicability of our model carries relevant policy implications as it provides a conceptual framework for the design of institutions to alleviate the welfare costs associated with definitivity avoidance.

Play it again! A Natural Experiment on Definitivity Avoidance

Thomas Bassetti
;
2020

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce Definitivity Avoidance, a behavioral bias that induces individuals to inefficiently shy away from choices that involve a final judgment. We model its effects and explore how the introduction of explicit exposure mechanisms can contribute to attenuate them. Using a unique natural experiment - the introduction of a technology-assisted review system in professional tennis - we test the model predictions and confirm the relevance of this behavioral bias in a competitive setting. Possible instances of definitivity avoidance can be identified in multiple contexts such as debt roll-over decisions, inefficient asset allocations, court rulings, and child adoptions. The broad applicability of our model carries relevant policy implications as it provides a conceptual framework for the design of institutions to alleviate the welfare costs associated with definitivity avoidance.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3356950
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