Does the US Supreme Court acknowledge freedom of ‘discriminating expressions’? Not, but… From Chaplinsky (1942), to Masterpiece (2018), the development of the Supreme Court’s free speech case-law

One of the most debated topics over freedom of expression concerns its possible limitations. The US Supreme Court has developed its specific approach – since Chaplinsky (1942) – narrowly describing the possible margins of intervention of public authorities in the delicate sphere of First Amendment guarantees. Today, as in the past, freedom of expression together with freedom of religion (in those cases involving same-sex partners) has revived the debate around the possibility to adopt and impose anti-discrimination statutes. This contribution examines the Supreme Court’s case law on freedom of expression and hate speech. From Chaplinsky (1942) to Masterpiece (2018) this analysis discusses the Court’s attitude toward limitations on freedom of expression based on the principle of anti-discrimination. The today challenge, posed by those who claim that their right to freedom of religion should prevail over the rights of other individuals with a different sexual orientation not to be discriminated, requires a deep examination on how – and to what extent – it is possible to balance two opposite positions without compromising the dignity of one of two sides.