This article investigates the phenomenon of ‘unholy alliances’: grand coalitions and ideologically-incoherent coalitions in the EU. In the last decade, these types of government majorities have proliferated, even in countries that have not previously experienced them. This substantial increase happened during the years of the so-called Great Recession, together with the electoral growth of populist movements and new political parties. This article investigates the potential correlation between these ‘unholy alliances’ and the economic situation of countries. The hypothesis is that negative economic trends might have led to fragmented electoral results, a decrease in the support for mainstream parties and the growth of populist parties and new parties. This generated additional difficulties in forming homogeneous coalitions, forcing the birth of these unholy alliances.

The Relationship between Economic Performance and the Rise of ‘Unholy Alliances’ in the European Union

Marco Morini
2018

Abstract

This article investigates the phenomenon of ‘unholy alliances’: grand coalitions and ideologically-incoherent coalitions in the EU. In the last decade, these types of government majorities have proliferated, even in countries that have not previously experienced them. This substantial increase happened during the years of the so-called Great Recession, together with the electoral growth of populist movements and new political parties. This article investigates the potential correlation between these ‘unholy alliances’ and the economic situation of countries. The hypothesis is that negative economic trends might have led to fragmented electoral results, a decrease in the support for mainstream parties and the growth of populist parties and new parties. This generated additional difficulties in forming homogeneous coalitions, forcing the birth of these unholy alliances.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3285138
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