Il noto e il conosciuto. Ontologia ed epistemologia nella filosofia di Hegel

In this paper, I want to show that Hegel’s philosophy is not reducible to a kind of subjective idealism according to which the reality of world (the ontological dimension) is merged into the structure of subjectivity (the epistemological dimension), or which think that the reality of world is a construction of the thinking subject. I want to show how Hegel’s philosophy can be read as a radical attempt to save the world from its reduction to a mere projection, a simulacrum or a subjective construction. That of Hegel is a very radical attempt, because he wants to save the autonomy of the world recognizing at the same time the role of the epistemic structures of subjectivity to the constitution of reality. The subjective epistemic structure are not extraneous, according to Hegel, to the very concept of the world and this non-extraneity is the condition of possibility, in order to think the access to the world by the subject.