The paper explores conditions under which retailer ownership of a supply firm is a more efficient form of organization than both supllier ownership of the outlets and franchise contract. Assuming that investments are non contractible , its is shown that retailer ownership tends to be preferable when: a) the retailer's investments have the highest impact on the relation's surplus, and b) the parties' investments have a poor impact on the value of their outside options

Integrated Retail Chains, Franchising, and Retailer Cooperatives

CHILLEMI, OTTORINO;
2005

Abstract

The paper explores conditions under which retailer ownership of a supply firm is a more efficient form of organization than both supllier ownership of the outlets and franchise contract. Assuming that investments are non contractible , its is shown that retailer ownership tends to be preferable when: a) the retailer's investments have the highest impact on the relation's surplus, and b) the parties' investments have a poor impact on the value of their outside options
2005
Strategies for Cooperation
9783832244460
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/1421292
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
  • OpenAlex ND
social impact