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Some Remarks on Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

1 Introduction and summary

The philosophy of subjective spirit developed by Hegel in his *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* constitutes a truly interesting theory about the individual and finite mind. Hegel's unique style of thought gives often rise to original solutions to classical philosophical questions. We believe that this is also the case for his treatment of mental phenomena, and we will provide in the following paragraphs some arguments to support this thesis.

We will begin by pointing out the premises of Hegel's treatment of subjective spirit, and then we will discuss their implications. In particular, we will highlight those ideas that promise to be of interest for contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In the first part of the paper we will introduce two key concepts of our understanding of the philosophy of subjective spirit: namely, the gradualism and pluralism of Hegel's theory of finite mind. We will then proceed in the second part with a discussion of some potential red herrings regarding the gradualist and pluralist features of Hegel's theory. This will allow us to consolidate our reading and to briefly sketch the main theme of the explanatory aims and extensions of the philosophy of subjective spirit.

2 The philosophy of subjective spirit: spirit as „knowing“

The philosophy of subjective spirit is the first part of the larger philosophy of spirit, which in Hegel's systematization follows upon logic and philosophy of nature. After having introduced the general concept of spirit, Hegel turns to its first determination – subjective spirit. Subjective spirit is defined by Hegel as „knowing“ spirit,¹ and its subdivisions comprise Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology. We should at least make three remarks regarding the subject matter of philosophy of subjective spirit.

The first remark is that „knowing“, as „cognition“, has already been treated by Hegel in the *Logic*.² In the subjective spirit section of the *Enzyklopädie* Hegel returns to the issue from a different point of view. This time cognition is being studied on the concrete level of spirit. While logical categories are the pure rational elements of thought that innervate reality, spirit is knowledge

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), in *Gesammelte Werke*, Hamburg, 1992, henceforth cited as „Enz.“ followed by the paragraph number; „A“ indicates an *Anmerkung*, „Z“ a *Zusatz*. For the *Logic* we have used Brinkmann and Dahlstrom's translation, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic*, Cambridge, 2010. For the *Philosophy of Nature* and for the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* we have adopted Petry's translations, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, London, 1970, and *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, Dordrecht, 1978. See *Enz* § 387.

² G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Hamburg, 1978 and 1981, Eng. trans. by A. V. Miller, *Science of Logic*, London, 1969. Henceforth cited as „WdL“ followed by volume, section and chapter number. The description of the determination of cognition is found in *WdL* 2.3.2.

of what is most concrete.³ Thus, subjective spirit is the study of the category of cognition as it is applied to the concrete development of spirit after its „resurrection“ from nature. Just as it is grounded in Logic, the study of *Geist* is consequently grounded also in the preceding study of Nature.

The second remark regards the practical aspect of „knowing“. Since subjective spirit’s central topic is knowing, it may seem that the speculations involved are exclusively theoretical. But this is not the case. The theoretical and the practical dimensions are so intertwined in Hegel that in some cases it is impossible to disentangle them. Thus, in Hegel’s philosophy „knowing“ always has to be taken as a practical as well as a theoretical enterprise.

The third set of remarks bear on the subject of „knowing“. Spirit in its subjective development involves a series of different figures: soul, consciousness, and spirit as such. These determinations do not exhaust spirit’s capacity of knowing. Beyond subjective spirit we find the categories of objective spirit and of absolute spirit. Subjective spirit abstracts from these further substantiations of *Geist*. The subject of subjective knowing is, therefore, a finite and abstract singular mind.

These special features of subjective spirit permits us to identify some general characteristics of Hegel’s treatment of mental phenomena. The first characteristic follows from Hegel’s systematic approach to the treatment of the finite mind. Since it is part of a larger process of development, the philosophy of subjective spirit does not constitute a *starting point* for philosophy or for knowledge. Subjective spirit „is nothing more than the discovery by spirit of its rationality that permeates all its lower moments and forms. This discovery is the progressive liberation of the spirit from finitude.“⁴ Hegel’s approach to mental phenomena rejects the classical Cartesian starting point adopted by many theories of mind. In particular, the single individual mind is not conceived as an Archimedean point, nor is it conceived as something problematic *per se*.

Another interesting feature of the systematic framework of subjective spirit is, paradoxically, its *incompleteness*. There is more to the description of mind than is contained in the section on subjective spirit: a full explanation of the mental phenomenon requires, according to Hegel, the extension of our horizon beyond the domain of the single finite and abstract mind into the historical and intersubjective domains of objective spirit and absolute spirit. This is again an anti-Cartesian feature of Hegel’s treatment of the mental, since it sees cognition as something which is not limited to the personal, private, isolated space inside the head of the finite subject.

The third interesting feature of subjective spirit follows again from the systematic background, along with Hegel’s continuing focus on describing *Geist* in terms of development. As it does not constitute a starting point, the finite mind is not conceivable as something *immediately* given. Its description, rather, follows a process of development from lower, passive, more simple determinations to higher, more active, complex determinations. At the same time, while defending an idea of subjective spirit as *one*, Hegel gives us back a description of the finite mind as a complex activity. What makes all this possible are two essential features of Hegel’s explanation of mental phenomenon: its *gradualism* and *pluralism*. Although we will study these two features in detail in the following paragraphs, let us explain them briefly here. Mind, Hegel is very clear on this,⁵ emerges from the natural world, since *Geist* presupposes nature.⁶ Mind’s emergence is gradual and it involves a process of development from determinations still entangled in the natural and bodily dimensions toward incrementally higher and freer psychic determinations. These determinations – although they initially have to be understood as steps along spirit’s teleological route to freedom – can also be particular and concrete moments. This implies that mental phenomena,

³ Enz § 377.

⁴ A. Ferrarin, „La ripresa hegeliana del *nous* aristotelico“, in *Materiali per un lessico della ragione*, ed. M. Barale, Pisa, 2001, 337 [our translation].

⁵ Enz § 381.

⁶ For an accurate analysis of this „passage through presuppositions,“ see M. Quante, „Die Natur: Setzung und Voraussetzung des Geistes“, in *Subjektivität und Anerkennung*, ed. B. Merker, G. Mohr, M. Quante, Paderborn, 2004, 81–101.

although *unified*, are widespread and constituted by a plurality of determinations, levels, and systems which, the higher ones excepted, are not necessarily linguistic and conceptual.

3 Philosophy of subjective spirit as a theory of finite mind

Given the premises just discussed, the philosophy of subjective spirit possesses a unique set of features that make it a unique and original approach to many classical problems in the philosophy of mind.

Hegel defends a strongly *anti-dualist* position on finite mind. Nature and *Geist* are not two ontologically separate substances, and mind is always embodied.⁷ In this manner Hegel's approach tries to navigate between the Scylla of reductionist materialism and the Charybdis of *naïve* – and merely subjective – idealism regarding the relationship between body and soul, which he defines as an expressive relationship.⁸ Hegel's hylomorphism, while remaining problematical on several aspects,⁹ slips between the classical problems of substance dualism and reductionist monism.

Another original attempt made by Hegel is to try to explain mental states with an approach that conjoins first and third person perspectives without falling into some forms of reductionism. Hegel wants to provide a *capacious and extended* explanation of mind, an explanation that can acknowledge the inner and subjective side of mental states while at the same time investigating them from a third-person objective standpoint. In this way, conscious mental states and their subjective contents – what today we would call *qualia* – are taken seriously and preserved in the logic of the explanation without being considered as something mystical or rationally intractable. This latter point, of course, has to be taken as a programmatic statement, since the actual treatment of the soul-body relation is not exempt from many problems and questions.

Hegel's anti-Cartesian decision not to make the finite mind the starting point for the philosophical enterprise coincides with a marked *anti-foundationalist* attitude. Thanks to the systematic framework, the Hegelian theory of mind does not structure its explanation according to a foundationalist need to ground our capacity to know the world in some kind of necessity. The problem of the foundation is a false problem, and it is the source of the biased standpoint of consciousness and of subjective idealism. This does not of course mean that the philosophy of subjective spirit is entirely devoid of epistemological issues. On the contrary, there is much room in Hegel's treatment of mental phenomenon for the explanations of how it is possible to have adequate knowledge – adequate for the limited possibilities of an abstract subjectivity – and even of how it is possible to describe errors and experience as inadequate forms of knowledge.

As we have seen, Hegel's account of mental phenomena does not end with the description of the finite and abstract mind but continues in the subsequent sections of the *Enzyklopädie*. Mental activity is not enclosed within the „walls“ of the skull; rather, it extends beyond the biological boundaries of the subjects. This feature makes Hegel eligible to be considered among the precursors of the „*extended mind*“ theory,¹⁰ and permits us to use his philosophy of spirit – as has been done recently¹¹ – as a way of elucidating and resolving some problems in this theory.

7 In this way, Hegel rejects what we would today call the mind/body problem. See *Enz* § 389 A. On the issue it could be very useful Italo Testa, „Anima e Corpo nell'Enciclopedia o il naturalismo di Hegel“, in *Il problema Mente-Corpo: genealogia, modelli, prospettive di ricerca*, ed. by M. Giannasi and F. Guadalupe Masi, Milano, 2008, 137–55.

8 *Enz* § 411.

9 Two questions that could be reasonably raised are, for example, what is the relation of this hylomorphism to that of Aristotle, and how can it be characterized – as anomalous monism or as property dualism?

10 See D. Chalmers, A. Clark, „The Extended Mind“, *Analysis* 58 (1998).

11 A. Crisafi & S. Gallagher, „Hegel and the Extended Mind“, *AI & Society* 25 (2010).

Furthermore, the gradualistic and pluralistic aspects of Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit contribute to making this approach different from theories that equate mind merely with the linguistic and conceptual dimension.¹² In addition to representing a rather narrow description of mind, such theories are exposed to three problems. First, whatever their ontological premises, these theories have to accept a gap between mental phenomena and reality. They remain, in Hegelian terms, in the domain of consciousness, since they establish a dualism between the knowing subject and the knowable object. But as we have already seen, Hegel is completely alien to epistemological concerns of a *prescriptive* nature: the philosophy of subjective spirit does not need to worry about providing any justification for knowledge. The „splendid isolation“ of the space of reasons is thus broken, and when the wall between it and the space of nature crumbles, any danger of falling into subjective idealism or relativistic holism vanishes.

Second, theories that equate mind exclusively with the linguistic and conceptual dimensions can hardly give a consistent description of the possibility of the development from a pre-linguistic to full linguistic state – and thus from a pre-mental to a mental state. If meanings are a *prerequisite* for consciousness, and if they arise from the interaction between a self, the other members of the linguistic community, and an external objective world, then we are stuck in a vicious circle since meanings *need* the subject's capacity to separate himself from the others and from the world, while that capacity is in turn conditioned by the possession of consciousness.

Third, theories of this kind restrict the possession of mental states to a small club of entities, e. g. those able to master language and concepts. This means that it is impossible on the basis of these theories to explain the behavior of subjects who are not fully conscious and rational human beings in terms of mental states. And this means that prelinguistic children, mentally deficient persons, and animals are excluded from the mental.

By contrast, Hegel's theory should be able to sidestep these problems. Thanks to its gradualist and pluralistic features, and to the systematic framework in which it is embedded, the philosophy of subjective spirit should be able to build an *extended* and *original* explanation of the mental. We have briefly seen what we mean by the systematic framework – the integration of the philosophy of subjective spirit into a complex philosophical system including logical and natural as well as spiritual determinations and which is circular and presuppositionless. This might be called the *external* source of the originality of subjective spirit. What we might call instead the *internal* sources of the originality of subjective spirit are its gradualist and pluralist components. As we said, these features are again strictly connected with the systematic structure. But in this case what is looked at is not the systematic structure of the framework of subjective spirit, but instead the *internal* systematic structure of subjective spirit. Space does not permit us a full exploration and explanation of these last features. We will shall therefore simply indicate which interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit *ought not* to be adopted.

4 Some Red Herrings about the *Entwicklung* of subjective spirit

A fuller and clearer definition of the gradualist and pluralist features of subjective spirit crucially depends on an exact characterization of the dialectical process of development found in this section of the *Enzyklopädie*. By looking carefully at this process of development (*Entwicklung*, as Hegel calls it) it is possible to identify three false trails that we could take in following a gradualist and pluralist interpretation of subjective spirit. We will now briefly discuss these red herrings.

¹² This point is particularly stressed by R. Winfield, *Hegel and Mind. Rethinking Philosophical Psychology*, New York, 2010. While accepting some of Winfield's particular premisses, we do not accept the whole of his conclusion. For a more articulate critique of Winfield see P. Biasetti, „Il gradualismo nella psicologia hegeliana e gli stati mentali degli animali: una discussione“, *Verifiche* 39 (2010).

The first red herring consists in equating the dialectical movement of subjective spirit with a sort of phylogenetic *explanation* of how mental phenomena increases in complexity along a vector leading from a simple and rudimentary organism to the complex and linguistically structured mind of man. This would permit us to use the determinations of subjective spirit in order to construct a general explanation of mental activity outside the human sphere, or even to construct a theory of humanization. What is wrong with this interpretation? We have already seen that an explanation of mental activity beyond the human mind needs to be compatible with the premises of Hegel's discourse on mind, and the phylogenetic interpretation lead us to such a general theory. The problem in this case is that a phylogenetic explanation of the development of subjective spirit misinterprets the core idea of what Hegel calls *Entwicklung*. It is a misinterpretation not only because of Hegel's well known aversion to the evolutionary hypothesis.¹³ In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche said that Hegel's concept of *Entwicklung* had anticipated Darwin and Darwinism in general.¹⁴ But this is a gross error. The development of subjective spirit's determinations is logical, not temporal. In some parts of the system – in the three larger determinations of absolute spirit, for example – the dialectical movement acquires a preeminently historical dimension; but this is not true of subjective spirit – except, as we shall see in the next paragraph, in relation to Hegel's brief reconstruction of the historical steps required for understanding mind. Even though the focus here is on the more simple and primitive forms of natural soul, Hegel is talking about a purely human phenomenon. Hegel's gradualism is not genealogical, since the teleological trajectory of subjective spirit points exclusively to the free spirit – that is, the rational and free-willed rational being.¹⁵

This does not amount to saying that Hegel sees animals as automatons *à la* Descartes. As we have noted before, given our premiss, we should still be able to construct a theory of mental activity in animals in „Hegelian fashion“, even if a phylogenetic interpretation of subjective spirit is precluded.¹⁶ According to Hegel, animals carry the spark of subjectivity, and have, in some cases, feelings, self-awareness, and other analogous mental qualities.¹⁷ But if we look carefully at this section of the *Enzyklopädie*, the truth is that these faculties are not assimilable to the ones we find depicted in the philosophy of subjective spirit:¹⁸ they are different, and, from the speculative standpoint adopted by Hegel, perhaps their philosophical treatment is inessential. This should

13 On this point, see S. Houlgate, *An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History. Second Edition*, Oxford, 2005, 173–5. As we know from *Enz* § 368 Z Hegel considered his contemporary Lamarck „a French genius“, but his judgment clearly does not refer to Lamarck's theory of evolution: instead Hegel makes reference to Lamarck's reformulation of Aristotle's division of animals as blooded and non-blooded in the new form of a division into vertebrates and invertebrates. Hegel is very clear on evolution in *Enz* § 249.

14 F. Nietzsche, *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Berlin, 1980, Vol. 3, § 356.

15 If we look at it closely, even in a section of the Anthropology concerned with natural and animal determinations, Hegel makes constant, though not exclusive, reference to human traits such as sleepwalking, mental illness, dreams, etc. These traits are not seen as a crude return to a primitivite dimension: they are explained instead as forms of „giantisms“ in certain determinations of the soul. The madman does not lose anything „on the side of the mind“ but is only living in contradiction with it (*Enz* § 408 Z). Hegel memorably states that only man has the privilege of madness, and this is because he is a thinking being. Furthermore, Hegel says that man does not think only in the waking state, but even in sleep, since thought always remains at the core of every determination of subjective spirit (*Enz* § 399 Z). On the fact that soul is a purely human determination, see A. Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, Cambridge, 2004, 264. On the fact that, for Hegel, rationality involves the *possibility* of becoming mad, as seen in the Anthropology, see R. Bodei, *Sistema ed epoca in Hegel*, Bologna 1975, 38–9.

16 For an example of such an explanation see T. Pinkard, *Hegel's Naturalism. Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life*, Oxford, 2012.

17 On this question see K. Brinkmann, „Hegel on the Animal Organism“, *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* I (1996).

18 In *Ein Fragment zur Philosophie des Geistes 1822/5*, which can be found in M. J. Petry, *Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit*, Dordrecht and Boston 1978, vol. I (henceforth cited as *Frag*), Hegel says clearly that sensation, even if it is of a bodily and hence animal nature, is still different in human beings and in non-human animals: „Sensation [*Empfindung*] is animal to the extent that it is corporeal. The animality of the non-human creature is not the same as

be easy to capture after we notice that while on the one hand man's natural soul is a part of the development of *Geist*, on the other hand the souls of animals are, strictly speaking, still part of Nature. While these latter souls surely express mentality, at the same time they explain nothing about it – and so they are not part of subjective spirit.

A side issue: Hegel differentiates man and animals on the basis of thought,¹⁹ which is essentially *language* and *will*. Man is indeed an animal, but since he is capable of knowing this fact he must be considered more than an animal, as Hegel explicitly states in his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*.²⁰ If thought is essentially language and will, and if it is needed to differentiate man from animal, does this mean that – contrary to what we have stated before – every mental structure in man is linguistically-based? A careful reading of some Hegelian passages can shed light on this problem – in particular some passages contained in the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*. According to Hegel, the animal comes to the world fully complete, while man, when born, represents only the *potential* of becoming a man.²¹ It is this very potential that renders a child something completely different from an animal: and this potential coincides with *the potentiality of learning a language*. This potentiality does not need to be necessarily actualized; its mere existence is enough to create a gulf between man and animals. Hegel seems to structure subjective spirit like a *vaulted arch*. Free spirit – as the union of linguistic intelligence and free will – is the keystone that supports the whole construction. But even if they depend on this keystone, the other bricks have a particular existence *per se*. In a word, inferior mental structures require the possibility of language and will, but are not, taken by themselves, linguistically structured.

And here we came to the second red herring. Even if our metaphor of the vaulted arch – which is built starting from the ground, but needs a keystone in order to stand by itself – is right, this does not entail that we may interpret the gradualism of subjective spirit as an *ontogeny* of the mental or as a sort of developmental psychology. Free spirit, as the final destination of the teleological route of this part of Hegel's system, is not a temporal recapitulation of the previous stages – as we said before, free spirit is the logical destination.²² And free spirit is logical in the sense of

that of man, however, so that anthropological consideration has to pass beyond the animality of sensing to grasp the sensing of the soul" (129).

19 See for example *Enz* § 2 and § 50 A.

20 „Man is an animal, but even in his animal functions, he is not confined to the implicit as the animal is; he becomes conscious of them, recognizes them, and lifts them, as for instance in the process of digestion, into self-conscious science. In this way man breaks the barrier of his implicit and immediate character, so that precisely because he *knows* that he is an animal, he ceases to be an animal and attains knowledge of himself as spirit“ G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: lectures on fine arts*, trans. by T. M. Knox, Oxford, 1975, 80.

21 See for examples this passages, taken from G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the philosophy of world history*, trans. by R. F. Brown & P. C. Hodgson, Oxford, 2011, Vol. 1: „Humans have only the potential of being human when they are born. Animals are born nearly complete“ (151); „what is human could not have developed from animal stupor, but it could well have developed from human stupor. If we begin with a natural state, what we find is an animal-like humanity, not an animal nature, not animal stupor. Animal-like humanity is something wholly different from animal nature. Spirit does not develop out of the animal, does not begin from the animal; rather it begins from spirit, but from a spirit that at first is only implicit, is a natural and not an animal spirit – a spirit on which the character of the human is imprinted. Thus a child has the possibility of becoming rational, which is something wholly different and much higher than the developed animal. An animal does not have the possibility of becoming conscious of itself. We cannot ascribe rationality to a child, but the first cry of the child is already different from that of an animal; from the outset it has the human stamp. Something human is already present in the simple movement of the child“ (153).

22 In criticizing Condillac's psychology Hegel is very clear on this point: „In this context one is not to think of the development of the individual, for this is involved in what is anthropological, and in accordance with it faculties and powers are observed to emerge in succession and to express themselves in existence. On account of Condillac's philosophy, there was a time when great importance was attached to the comprehension of this progression, it being assumed that such a conjectured natural emergence might demonstrate how these faculties arise and explain them“ (*Enz* § 442 A).

being *necessary*: the thought that thinks itself cannot think its history in contingent or accidental terms.

This latter point brings us to the third and last red herring, which consists in the interpretation of the single determinations of subjective spirit as abstract functions of a mind divided into modules and faculties. In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Hegel had already criticized this approach to psychology, which pictures the mind as an empty sack filled with unconnected faculties.²³ In the critique of empirical psychology carried out in the *Enzyklopädie* Hegel reiterates his opposition to the abstract division of mind into different intellectual activities.²⁴ *Geist* knows itself as something which is *one*, first by the way of a simple *Gefühl* of its living unity,²⁵ then through the rational knowledge that this unity is determined by a final cause,²⁶ the Concept. This makes it impossible to conceive Hegel's theory of subjective spirit as a form of *modularism*.²⁷ On Hegel's view, such a theory, besides being false as a matter of fact, would also twist the epistemic scheme needed to the understanding of *Geist*. A modularist theory could be developed by exclusively employing the logical categories of *mechanism* and *chemism*. However, subjective spirit, like life, also requires the explanatory category of *teleology* in order to be understood.

5 Provisional conclusions

Having excluded these red herrings, how should we understand gradualism in the *Entwicklung* of subjective spirit? Our answer to the question can be stated briefly as follows: Hegel weaves a plurality of explanatory levels into the dialectical development of subjective spirit that are held together by a common thread. Some of these explanatory levels directly regard the topic of mind, while others focus on related topics that, in Hegel's view, are to be addressed in order to reach a full comprehension of spirit at the stage of mind. In this context we cannot see in detail what these explanatory threads are. Therefore, we will simply sketch some general perspectives and underline some critical points raised by our interpretation of Hegel's theory of subjective spirit as a theory of a gradually extending mind.

We have repeatedly emphasized that Hegel's philosophy is not Cartesian. Nevertheless, we have to admit that a certain Cartesian trait in Hegel's speculation cannot be denied. This acknowledgment does not reduce to Hegel's famous characterization of Descartes as the initiator of Modern Philosophy and as the return of spirit to itself. There is a much more systematic point at which Cartesianism is at stake in Hegel's philosophy – at the intersection of necessity and accidentality. Hegel is not content with stating that the course of the history of thought, at both an individual and an intersubjective level, has simply been as it has been; he claims that there is a necessity for thought to recognize that in a singular point of the History the *truthful* – in the sense of veridically rational – recollection of the whole history occurs. This means that the whole recapitulation of the ponderous work of the concept *cannot be contingent*: there is a necessity, an absolute necessity, that this recognizing recollection takes place at a certain precise point. Systematically, this

²³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Hamburg, 1980; trans. by A. V. Miller, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford, 1977. Henceforth quoted as *Phän*, followed by references to section, chapter and paragraph. See *Phän* C. V.73.

²⁴ *Enz* § 378.

²⁵ *Enz* § 379.

²⁶ *Enz* § 442 A. See also *Enz* § 130 A, where Hegel claims that if we try to explain the faculties or activity of *Geist* as completely *discrete* features, the result is that to entangle spirit with living unity.

²⁷ Hegel also advances a weird „empirical“ argument to show the unity of mental phenomena: that of animal magnetism or *hypnosis*. This phenomenon shows, in Hegel's opinion, that it is not possible to conceive mind only through the categories of intellect (cf. *Enz* 379 Z. See also *Ein Fragment*, in M. J. Petry, op. cit., I, p. 99).

particular point has to be acknowledged to be Hegel's mindful owl-like recollection and representation of the logical-historical development of thought. But this necessarily presupposes another step, which somehow mediates the transition from Nature to Spirit, from the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* to the *Ezyklopädie*, i. e. the point at which the reflecting ego reflects on his reflecting and sees the (empty) necessity of his reflection.

As is well known, from a systematical point of view this is one of the most problematic points of Hegel's whole philosophy. Consequently, this is clearly the topic of a further, much more elaborate investigation. For the moment we feel ourselves justified in stating that the problem of *finite* mind is the problem of an extended mind, that cannot content itself with simply stating its existence but proposes to demonstrate its necessity: *thought thinking itself cannot think its history in contingent or accidental terms*. Since thought is historical thought, i. e. capable of thinking the necessity of its history, it cannot be contingent. It is a necessary fact which extends this necessity to the whole – past, present and future – history which is connected to it. But this extension ends, if it ends at all, beyond the limits of this contribution.

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