Independent Regulatory Agencies, implementation strategies and credible commitment. A comparative research on Universal Service policies in Italy and the UK

The rise and diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in Europe as a new institutional model has modified the policy game in many policy sectors. Regulation has become much more complex in terms of definition of policy goals, number of players involved, instruments adopted, capacity of implementation and effectiveness. Public institutions, market operators, and citizens are part of a dense network of multi-level relations constantly ‘in tension’ between the two central regulatory functions of promotion of competition and protection of users’ rights. Within this regulatory environment national IRAs are key-players. However, apart from the general acceptance of their importance, research analysing IRAs’ role in policy-making processes is still scarce. The provision of Universal Service Obligation (USO) is one of the most important policy goals of the EU telecom regulation and all the member-State are called to implement similar methods to promote it. USO goals may be fulfilled through different regulatory instruments such as quality standards, economic incentives and alternative dispute resolution between consumers and operators that are managed directly by IRAs. The paper is therefore aimed at identifying the specific institutional variables that influence the adoption of (USO) programs at the national level. Particularly it will investigate to what extent the role played by IRAs within the policy process is changing the interplay between public and private actors in terms of allocation of tasks and resources and different capacity to intervene in the policy process. The paper presents the preliminary findings of a research project on independent regulation in the telecommunication sector carried in Italy and UK and relies on data collected through an in-depth qualitative analysis.