In analytic philosophy with “bundle theory” one means a set of ontological theories considering an individual entity, in particular an entity persisting through time, as nothing more than a bundle of properties, in particular – in the case of a persistent entity – the properties that it posseses during its existence. In general, a result of the bundle theory (henceforth BT) is that it is not the case that two individuals have all the same properties without being identical. In other terms, one formulation of the identity of indiscernibles (henceforth (IdIn)). In the analytic tradition, BT has been brought again to Leibniz, because it can be considered a result of the Leibnitian thesis that each individual substance posseses a complete concept. Such a concept allows the deduction of all its properties. In Leibniz, the explanation of the concept of complete concept depends on an explanation of the notion of property. This last is highly problematic for many reasons: because Leibniz argues for a reduction of the relation properties to non-relational properties, but, at the same time, he adfirms that the complete concept implies infinite relations; because it is not clear at all the Leibnitian conception of these non-relational properties; and finally for some Leibniz’s scholars the supposed distinction between essential and accidental properties. Similarly, also the bundle theorists are interesting in an expnation of the notion of “property”.
Haecceitism in Leibniz. Some Remarks
CARRARA, MASSIMILIANO
2001
Abstract
In analytic philosophy with “bundle theory” one means a set of ontological theories considering an individual entity, in particular an entity persisting through time, as nothing more than a bundle of properties, in particular – in the case of a persistent entity – the properties that it posseses during its existence. In general, a result of the bundle theory (henceforth BT) is that it is not the case that two individuals have all the same properties without being identical. In other terms, one formulation of the identity of indiscernibles (henceforth (IdIn)). In the analytic tradition, BT has been brought again to Leibniz, because it can be considered a result of the Leibnitian thesis that each individual substance posseses a complete concept. Such a concept allows the deduction of all its properties. In Leibniz, the explanation of the concept of complete concept depends on an explanation of the notion of property. This last is highly problematic for many reasons: because Leibniz argues for a reduction of the relation properties to non-relational properties, but, at the same time, he adfirms that the complete concept implies infinite relations; because it is not clear at all the Leibnitian conception of these non-relational properties; and finally for some Leibniz’s scholars the supposed distinction between essential and accidental properties. Similarly, also the bundle theorists are interesting in an expnation of the notion of “property”.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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